What is Trustworthiness and What Drives It by Cox, James et al.
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
9-9-2014 
What is Trustworthiness and What Drives It 
James Cox 
Georgia State University 
Rudolf Kerschbamer 
University of Innsbruck 
Daniel Neururer 
University of Innsbruck 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Cox, James; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; and Neururer, Daniel, "What is Trustworthiness and What Drives It" 
(2014). ExCEN Working Papers. 39. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/39 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
What is Trustworthiness and What Drives It?∗
James C. Cox†, Rudolf Kerschbamer‡ and Daniel Neururer§
September 9, 2014
Abstract
This paper reports the results of experiments designed to isolate the
impact of various combinations of the following motives on trustworthi-
ness: (i) unconditional other-regarding preferences — like altruism, in-
equality aversion, quasi-maximin, etc.; (ii) deal-responsiveness — reacting
to actions that allow for a mutual improvement by adopting behavior
that implies a mutual improvement; (iii) gift-responsiveness — reacting
to choices that allow the trustee to obtain an improvement by adopt-
ing actions that benefit the trustor; and (iv) vulnerability-responsiveness
— reacting to the vulnerability of the trustor by adopting actions that
do not hurt the trustor. Our results indicate that — besides unconditional
other-regarding preferences — vulnerability-responsiveness is an important
determinant of trustworthiness even in cases where the vulnerability of the
trustor does not come together with a gift to the trustee. Motivated by
our empirical findings we provide formal definitions of trust and trust-
worthiness based on revealed willingness to accept vulnerability and the
response to it.
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1 Introduction
The economic literature is full of statements stressing the importance of trust
and trustworthiness for all kinds of human interactions. Fehr (2009, p.235), for
instance, writes that “trust plays a role in almost all human relationships. It
permeates friendship relations, family relations, and economic relations. People
rely on the support of their friends, children trust their parents, and sellers trust
their buyers to pay the bill.” Some empirical studies go even further by suggest-
ing a (causal) relationship between people’s perception of others trustworthiness
at the country level and important macro variables such as GDP growth (Knack
and Keefer 1997), inflation (La Porta et al. 1997), or trade volume (Guiso et
al. 2009).
Despite their importance for all kinds of economic relationships, there is no
consensus in the literature as to what defines trust and trustworthiness and what
drives them — see Coleman (1990), Bacharach et al. (2007) and Fehr (2009) for
discussions. One goal of the present paper is to provide formal definitions of
trust and trustworthiness based on observable variables. The second goal is the
identification of factors that drive trustworthiness in a specific class of games.
As we will argue below, those two goals are intimately related to each other.
Regarding definitions, there exist many verbal ones for trust in the economic
and the non-economic literature. In most of them ‘vulnerability’ plays a central
role. Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712), for instance, define trust as “the willingness
of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expec-
tation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor,
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.” Similar def-
initions can be found in McAllister (1995), Rousseau et al. (1998), Ferrin and
Dirks (2003), Ho and Weigelt (2005), and Colquitt et al. (2007), among others.
The second term — trustworthiness — is frequently used without explicitly defin-
ing it. One of the few exceptions to this is Glaeser et al. (2000) who state (on
p. 3 of the 1999 working paper version of the article) that “trustworthiness is a
behavior that increases the return to people who trust you.”
The experimental economic literature typically defines trust and trustwor-
thiness in terms of behavior in specific games. The most familiar example is the
investment game by Berg et al. (1995).1 In this two-stage game there are two
players — a first mover (FM, he) and a second mover (SM, she). The players
start with identical initial endowments — of e, say. In the first stage, the FM
decides on the amount t ∈ [0, e] he wants to transfer to the SM, knowing that
if he transfers t the SM will receive kt, with k > 1 (typically, k is 2, 3, 4, or 5).
In the second stage, the SM sees what the FM has done and then decides on
the amount r ∈ [0, kt] that she wants to return to the FM. After this move the
game ends with material payoffs of f = e− t+ r for the FM and s = e+ kt− r
for the SM.
Within the investment game a FM is said to trust if he sends more than
the minimum possible amount and a SM is said to be trustworthy if she re-
1 Indeed, this game is often called ‘the trust game’ — by Croson and Buchan (1999) and
Karlan (2005), for instance.
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turns more than the minimum possible amount (Burks et al. 2003 and Ben-Ner
and Putterman 2009 use this weak definition), or an amount that exceeds the
amount sent (Schotter and Sopher 2006 and Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007
employ this more demanding definition).2 However, it is not clear how these be-
havioral definitions of trust and trustworthiness extend to more general games
where players have richer action spaces or where material payoffs have a differ-
ent structure. One aim of the present paper is to propose definitions of trust
and trustworthiness that are applicable not only to a specific game but rather
to a non-trivial class of games — the class of two-player two-stage games with
observable actions. The form of the definitions is inspired by the formal defin-
itions of generosity and reciprocity introduced by Cox et al. (2008) and their
content is motivated by the results of experiments designed to yield insights into
the main drivers for trustworthiness.
The identification of drivers of trustworthiness is the other aim of this pa-
per. It is important for our first aim because it has an immediate impact on the
answer to the question what constitutes sensible definitions of trust and trust-
worthiness and what distinguishes those concepts from other related concepts.
As an illustration, consider again the investment game. In this game a trust
act by the FM (i.e. a positive transfer) is per design a generous act accord-
ing to established definitions (as the one by Cox et al. 2008, for instance). If
the SM interprets it that way and if the main motivation for her back-transfer
is to repay the generosity of the FM by her own generosity, then there is not
much room left for trust and trustworthiness as interesting concepts on their
own. They are then simply context-dependent special cases of the more general
concepts ‘generosity’ (or ‘kindness’) and ‘retaliation’ (or ‘reciprocal response’).
Regarding the identification of drivers for trustworthiness the pioneering
work is by Cox (2004) who proposes a triadic (i.e., a three-games) design to
discriminate between different motives for transfers (from the FM to the SM)
and back-transfers (from the SM to the FM) in the investment game. Rele-
vant for our goal of disentangling different drivers for trustworthiness are two
of his three treatments, one is the standard investment game (IG), the other
is a specially designed dictator game (DG). The crux of the Cox (2004) design
is that the distribution of endowments over dictator-recipient pairs in the DG
is chosen in such a way that it matches exactly the empirical distribution of
material payoffs over SM-FM pairs after FMs’ choices in the IG. In other words,
the population of dictators in the DG treatment faces exactly the same distrib-
ution over opportunity sets as the population of SMs in the IG treatment, but
in each pair the FM intentionally caused the choice set in the IG, while the
experimenter predetermined the choice set in the DG. For a given choice set of
2Berg et al. (1995) implement a discrete version of this game with e = 10 and k = 3
and find in their ‘no history’ treatment that 28 out of 32 FMs send more than the minimum
possible amount to SMs and that out of the 28 SMs who received more than the minimum
possible amount 11 shared the increase in total surplus by returning more than the FM sent
(but strictly less than they received). Qualitatively similar patterns are reported by Johnson
and Mislin (2011) in their meta-study examining 162 replications of the Berg et al. (1995)
investment game.
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the SM any difference between transfers in the DG treatment and back-transfers
in the IG treatment indicates that unconditional other-regarding concerns (such
as altruism, inequality aversion, maximin etc.) alone are not sufficient to ex-
plain back-transfers in the IG. Cox (2004) finds that back-transfers in the IG
are approximately one-third higher than transfers in the DG and concludes that
back-transfers in the IG are in part motivated by conditional other-regarding
concerns. However, the Cox (2004) design does not allow — and is not intended
to allow — for discrimination between different potential explanations for the
conditional part of the other-regarding preferences of the SM. The present pa-
per digs deeper by isolating the impact of various combinations of the following
motives: (i) unconditional other-regarding preferences — like altruism, inequality
aversion, quasi-maximin, etc.; (ii) deal-responsiveness — reacting to actions that
allow for a mutual improvement by adopting behavior that implies a mutual im-
provement; (iii) gift-responsiveness — reacting to choices that allow the trustee
to obtain an improvement by adopting actions that benefit the trustor; and
(iv) vulnerability-responsiveness — reacting to the vulnerability of the trustor
by adopting actions that do not hurt the trustor.
For this purpose we extend the Cox (2004) design to five diagnostic two-
player games. In each of the games a FM chooses an opportunity set for a SM
from a given collection of opportunity sets which is common information. Then
the SM chooses an allocation (implying a material payoff for each of the two
players) from the opportunity set chosen by the FM. In line with the formal
framework introduced by Cox et al. (2008) our main hypothesis is that the
SM’s interpretation of a given choice by the FM depends not only on the actual
choice made by the FM but also on the alternative choice(s) that would have
been available to the FM. By systematically varying the alternative choice(s)
available to the FM we address the question of how the SM’s decision within a
given opportunity set is affected by various combinations of revealed intentions
behind the FM’s choice.
The five treatments of our experimental design correspond to the five two-
player games shown in Figure 1. All of the treatments have the same non-trivial
feasible set for the SM. In four of the treatments the non-trivial feasible set for
the SM is reached only if the FM chooses option (b). The game-form to those
treatments is displayed in Panel A of Figure 1. These four treatments differ
only with respect to the allocation (contained in a singleton opportunity set)
that is implemented if the FM chooses option (a). The payoffs for option (a) for
the different treatments are displayed in Table 1. The other treatment — shown
in Panel B of Figure 1 — has the same option (b) feasible set for the SM but no
option (a) for the FM. The five treatments —implemented in a between-subjects
design — are:
• Treatment IG is a standard investment game à la Berg et al. (1995).
The main difference to the Berg et al. (1995) design is that the collec-
tion of opportunity sets the FM is asked to choose from consists of only
two elements: The FM can either (a) not invest, resulting in a singleton
opportunity set for the SM — the allocation (f, s) = (e, e); or (b) invest
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the whole endowment, resulting in a non-trivial opportunity set for the
SM — she can return any amount between 0 and 4e. Panel A of Figure
1 displays the resulting material game using the parameters and the dis-
crete grid implemented in the experiment. Important features of the IG
are that — in comparison to option (a) — option (b) (i) allows for a mutual
improvement [if the SM returns more than e but less than 3e then both
players are strictly better off]; (ii) involves a gift to the SM [the maximal
material payoff she can realize with option (b) exceeds the payoff she re-
ceives in (a)]; and (iii) makes the FM vulnerable [if the SM returns less
than e then the FM is worse off in material terms, compared to option
(a)].
• TreatmentDC is the deal-controlled investment game: It differs from
IG only in the payoffs for option (a), which are such that option (b) does
not create the possibility of a mutual improvement in comparison to option
(a). Still it keeps the features that — in comparison to option (a) — option
(b) allows the SM to obtain an improvement and makes the FM vulnerable.
• Treatment GC is the gift-controlled investment game: It differs from
IG only in the payoffs for option (a), which are such that the choice of
option (b) does neither create the possibility of a mutual improvement nor
allow the SM to obtain an unilateral improvement. Still, the choice of (b)
makes the FM vulnerable.
• Treatment VC is the vulnerability-controlled investment game: It
differs from IG only in the payoffs for option (a), which are such that the
choice of option (b) does not make the FM vulnerable in comparison to
option (a). Still, option (b) allows for a mutual improvement and for an
unilateral improvement for the SM.
• Treatment CC is the conditional-controlled investment game: It
differs from IG only in the fact that option (a) is not a feasible choice for
the FM; that is, the collection of opportunity sets for the FM consists of
a single element in this treatment, the option (b). So, no motives of the
FM are revealed in this treatment because no choice is made by the FM.
<Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here.>
The main results of our experiments involving 390 subjects are as follows: Con-
sistent with the findings by Cox (2004) we observe strictly positive transfers from
SMs to FMs in treatment CC and significantly higher transfers from SMs to FMs
in IG than in CC.3 Thus, unconditional other-regarding preferences seem to play
a role for the behavior of SMs in the investment game, but such preferences alone
are insufficient to explain behavior. Turning to the other treatments our most
3The two Cox treatments discussed above correspond to our treatments IG and CC, the
most important difference being that FMs in Cox’s IG have a richer choice set — they are
asked to transfer to the paired SM none, some or all of their endowment, while they face a
binary choice in our IG.
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important finding is that — besides unconditional other-regarding preferences
— vulnerability-responsiveness is an important determinant of trustworthiness
even in cases where the vulnerability of the trustor does not come together with
a gift to the trustee.
Motivated by our empirical findings and inspired by the formal framework
introduced by Cox et al. (2008) we provide formal definitions of trust-related
concepts. For this purpose we first define a partial ordering over opportunity
sets in the own-money-other’s-money space — the ‘More Trusting Than’ relation.
A key ingredient of this definition is the vulnerability of the FM. Based on this
definition we then provide behavioral definitions of trust act, trustworthy act
and trust-responsive motivation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents defini-
tions for unconditional other-regarding preferences, deal-responsiveness, gift-
responsiveness and vulnerability-responsiveness and describes the five mini-
games used for discrimination between motives. The experimental design and
the procedure are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 formulates the hypotheses.
Section 5 presents and discusses the experimental results. Section 6 provides
formal definitions of trust, trustworthiness and trust-responsiveness based on
observable variables and Section 7 concludes.
2 Definitions of Motives and Identification Games
2.1 Definitions
Motivated by the formal framework introduced by Cox et al. (2008) we present
in this subsection — for the class of two-player two-stage games of complete and
perfect information — definitions of unconditional other-regarding preferences;
revealed willingness to create the possibility of a mutual improvement and deal-
responsiveness; revealed willingness to allow the DM to obtain an improvement
and gift-responsiveness; and revealed willingness to accept vulnerability and
vulnerability-responsiveness. For this purpose let o = (f, s) denote an income
allocation that gives material payoff f to the FM and material payoff s to the
SM and consider a two-stage game in which
• the FM is asked to choose an opportunity set O consisting of income
allocations o = (f, s) out of some collection of opportunity sets O which
is common knowledge;
• the SM observes the opportunity set O chosen by the FM, acquires pref-
erences PO and then chooses a payoff vector (f, s) ∈ O.
For a given opportunity set O ∈ O let
• f∗O be the maximal feasible income of the FM in the opportunity set O;
that is, f∗O = sup{f ≥ 0 : ∃s ≥ 0 such that (f, s) ∈ O};
• s∗O be the maximal feasible income of the SM in the opportunity set O;
that is, s∗O = sup{s ≥ 0 : ∃f ≥ 0 such that (f, s) ∈ O};
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• fegO be the maximal feasible income of the FM in the opportunity set O,
given that the SM acts selfishly in own money terms; that is, fegO = sup{f :
(f, s∗O) ∈ O}; and
• c∗O be the maximal feasible total cake size in the opportunity set O; that
is, c∗O = sup{f + s : (f, s) ∈ O}.
Based on these definitions we now define three binary relations between oppor-
tunity sets — the "More Efficient Than" (MET) relation, the "More Beneficial
Than’ (MBT) relation and the "More Vulnerable Than" (MVT) relation.
Definition 1 Consider two opportunity sets J and K in O. We say that
• opportunity set J allows for a more efficient choice than (is "More Ef-
ficient Than", MET) opportunity set K if c∗J > c
∗
K and ∃(f
′, s′) ∈ J
such that f ′ > fegK and s
′ > s∗K;
• opportunity set J is more beneficial for the SM than (is "More Benefi-
cial Than", MBT) opportunity set K if s∗J > s
∗
K ;
• opportunity set J entails more vulnerability for the FM than (is "More
Vulnerable Than’", MVT) opportunity set K if fegJ < f
eg
K .
Each of those relations defines a partial ordering over opportunity sets. MBT
and MVT yield only partial (and not complete) orderings because they are
defined as strict inequalities. For MET an additional source for incomplete-
ness comes from the fact that the relation imposes two requirements. The first
condition says that for opportunity set J to be more efficient than some other
opportunity set K, the maximal feasible cake size in set J must be larger than
the maximal feasible cake size in set K. The second condition adds the require-
ment that the set J must contain an allocation that is better for both players
(in own-money terms) than the allocation that is realized in set K when the
SM acts selfishly in own-money terms.4 TheMBT relation defines opportunity
set J as more beneficial for the SM than opportunity set K if the maximum
material income the SM can get in set J exceeds the maximum material income
she can realize in set K.5 The MVT relation imposes the condition that for
opportunity set J to entail more vulnerability for the FM than opportunity set
K, the maximum income the FM can get in set J , given that the SM acts self-
ishly in own-money terms, falls short of his maximal income in set K under the
same condition.
Definition 2 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the SM from
the collection of opportunity sets O. If the opportunity sets J and K are both
available (that is, if J,K ∈ O) and
4Of course, one might think of alternative requirements here; for instance, the two inequal-
ities could be replaced by the milder condition c∗J > f
eg
K
+ s∗K . There are pros and cons for
each of these definitions. Since for the present context all plausible efficiency notions imply
the same ordering over opportunity sets we do not discuss this issue further here.
5Our MBT definition resembles the More Generous Than (MGT) relation by Cox et al.
(2008). We discuss the difference between the two in Subsection 5.2.
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• J is MET K then we say that the FM’s choice of J reveals the willing-
ness to create the possibility for a mutual improvement;
• J is MBT K then we say that the FM’s choice of J reveals the willing-
ness to allow the SM to obtain an improvement;
• J is MVT K then we say that the FM’s choice of J reveals the willing-
ness to accept vulnerability.
Borrowing again from Cox et al. (2008) we next define a partial ordering on pref-
erences of the SM over income allocations — the "More Altruistic Than" (MAT)
relation. For this purpose suppose that the SM has well-behaved preferences P
over feasible income allocations and that those preferences can be represented
by some smooth function uP (.) that assigns real numbers to any o = (f, s) in
a given domain D ⊂ R2+. Let WTPP (f, s) be the amount of own income a SM
with preferences P is willing to give up in order to increase the FM’s income






this framework Cox et al. (2008) now formalize (in their Definition 1) the idea
that one preference ordering is more altruistic than another. We restate their
definition here as:
Definition 3 For a given domain D ⊂ R2+ preference relation P on D is more
altruistic than ("More Altruistic Than", MAT) preference relation P ′ on
D if WTPP (f, s) ≥WTPP ′(f, s) for all (f, s) ∈ D.
Based on those definitions we now define:
Definition 4 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the SM from the
collection of opportunity sets O. Suppose the FM chooses J ∈ O and suppose
that this choice elicits preferences PJ in the SM.
• If J is the only element in O (so that the FM has no real choice to make)
and if WTPPJ (f, s) 
= 0 for some (f, s) then we say that the SM has
unconditional other-regarding preferences.
• If the choice of J reveals the willingness to create the possibility for a
mutual improvement and if this fact elicits more altruistic preferences in
the SM compared to a situation where only J is available we say that the
SM’s preferences exhibit deal-responsiveness.
• If the choice of J reveals the willingness to allow the SM to obtain an
improvement and if this fact elicits more altruistic preferences in the SM
compared to a situation where only J is available we say that the SM’s
preferences exhibit gift-responsiveness.
• If the choice of J reveals the willingness to accept vulnerability and if
this fact elicits more altruistic preferences in the SM compared to a situ-




Our experimental design involves five treatments that correspond to parameter-
ized and discrete versions of the following five games:
IG is a standard investment game à la Berg et al. (1995). The main
difference to the usual design is that the collection of opportunity sets the FM
is asked to choose from consists of only two elements: The FM can either (a)
not invest, resulting in a singleton opportunity set for the SM — an allocation
where both players earn their endowment e; or (b) invest the whole endowment,
resulting in a non-trivial opportunity set for the SM — she receives the tripled
transfer and has to decide which part of the augmented endowment of 4e she
wants to return.6 Panel A of Figure 1 and Table 1 display the material game
using the parameters and the discrete grid as implemented in the experiment.
DC is the deal-controlled investment game: It differs from IG only in the
payoff of the SM for option (a). This payoff is increased from e to 3e, keeping
all the other details of the game constant. This design feature implies that the
choice of option (b) does not create the possibility of a mutual improvement in
material terms — the available cake size is 4e if the FM decides for (a) and it is
4e if the FM decides for (b).
GC is the generosity-controlled investment game: It differs from IG only
in the payoff of the SM for option (a). This payoff is increased from e to
4e, keeping all the other details of the game constant. This design feature
implies that option (b) does not allow the SM to obtain an improvement in
comparison to option (a) — the highest material payoff the SM can realize under
the opportunity set (b) is 4e which is exactly the amount she earns when the
FM decides for (a).
VC is the vulnerability-controlled investment game: It differs from IG
only in the payoff of the FM for option (a). This payoff is decreased from e to 0,
keeping all the other details of the game constant. This design feature implies
that the choice of option (b) by the FM does not make him more vulnerable
than the choice of option (a) — the lowest material payoff he receives under the
opportunity set (b) is 0 which is exactly the amount he earns when he decides
for (a).
CC is the conditional-controlled investment game: It differs from IG only
in the fact that option (a) is not a feasible choice for the FM. Thus, CC — shown
in Panel B of Figure 1 — is a dictator game where the SM faces exactly the same
choice set as in the other four games when the FM decides for option (b).
6That is, in contrast to the standard investment game we allow the SM to transfer not
only the amount received but also the initial endowment. We do not consider this detail as
important, though.
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3 Experimental Treatments and Procedures
The experiment was conducted with paper-and-pen (and several other design
features reported below were applied) to convince subjects that neither other
subjects nor the experimenters could identify the person who has made any
particular decision. This was done in an attempt to minimize the impact of
experimenter demand and audience effects.7
Experimental Treatments: Our experimental design involves five treatments
that correspond to discrete and parameterized versions of the five games de-
scribed in the previous section, with the parameter e set to 15 experimental
currency units (ECUs) — see Figure 1 and Table 1 for details.8 In treatments
IG, DC, GC and VC the FM has to decide between option (a) and option (b),
in treatment CC only option (b) is available. In all treatments option (b) gives
the SM the task of deciding whether she wants to transfer some, all, or none of
60 ECUs — in steps of five — to the FM, and keep the remainder. That is, in all
treatments the task of the SM is to choose any number in {0, 5, 10, ... , 50, 55,
60}.
Experimental Procedures: Ten experimental sessions were conducted at the
University of Innsbruck from November 2011 to February 2013. Forty subjects
who had not participated in similar experiments before were invited to each
session using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner 2004). Since not all sub-
jects showed up in time, 390 (instead of the invited 400) subjects from various
academic backgrounds participated in total, and each subject participated in
one treatment only. After arrival, subjects assembled in one of the two labora-
tories and individually drew a sealed envelope containing a card with a number,
henceforth called the private code. Then instructions were distributed and read
aloud. Instructions informed subjects (i) that there are two roles in the exper-
iment, the role of a "Group A member" and the role of a "Group B member";
(ii) that there is exactly the same number of Group A members and Group B
members in the experiment and that roles are assigned randomly; (iii) that each
Group A member is matched with exactly one Group B member and vice versa,
and that at no point in time will a participant discover the identity of the person
she/he is matched with; (iv) that Group A members are called to make a single
decision that affects not only their own earnings from the experiment but also
the earnings of the Group B member they are matched with (the instructions
for treatment CC differ slightly in this and the next point — see the Appendix
for details); (v) that Group B members have also a single decision to make and
that the fact whether the decision of a Group B member is payoff-relevant or
7Our experimental design is inspired by the (almost) double blind procedures employed
by Hoffman et al. (1994), Cox (2004) and Cox and Sadiraj (2012). See List (2007) for a
discussion on experimenter demand effects and Hoffmann et al. (1994), Andreoni and Petrie
(2004), and Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) for experimental evidence indicating that audience
effects might have a significant impact on subjects’ behavior in dictator-game like situations.
8The instructions stated that the exchange rate was 5 ECUs (called Taler in the experiment)
to 1 Euro.
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not depends on the choice of the corresponding Group A member;9 and (vi)
that cash payments could be collected a few days after the experiment from one
of the secretaries who handles also the cash payments for other experiments (to
ensure that the amount a subject earns cannot be linked to her/his decisions).
After reading the instructions and answering questions from the subjects in pri-
vate, subjects were asked to open in private their envelope with the private code.
Subjects whose private code ended with an even number were assigned to Group
A and asked to stay in the same room. Subjects with an odd code assumed the
role of a Group B member and were escorted to the adjacent laboratory.
In both rooms subjects were seated at widely separated tables with sliding
walls. Group A and Group B members were handed out a decision sheet and an
empty envelope and they were asked to fill out the decision sheet in private.10
After the subjects in both rooms made their decisions, they wrote their private
code on the decision sheet and put the decision sheet into the unmarked enve-
lope. Envelopes were then collected with a letterbox by an experimenter. Before
leaving the room subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire. Anonymous
cash payments started a few days later — giving experimenters the opportunity
to manually match Group A with Group B members in the meantime. Par-
ticipants presented the card with their private code to an administrative staff
person who did not know who did what for which purpose, nor how cash pay-
ments were generated and they got their earnings in exchange (the fact that cash
payments would be made that way was clearly indicated in the instructions).
On average, subjects earned approximately 12.6 Euros (including a show up fee
of 5 Euros and a flat fee of 2.5 Euros for filling out the questionnaire).11
<Insert Table 2 about here.>
4 Hypotheses
In all treatments subjects in the role of SMs face exactly the same choice set,
they can transfer to an anonymously paired person in the FM role any number
in {0, 5, 10, . . . , 50, 55, 60}, and keep the remainder of the 60 ECUs. Let r
stand for the chosen transfer from a SM to the paired FM. Under the assump-
tion that subjects are exclusively interested in their own material income we
should observe r = 0 across all subjects in all treatments. This will be our
null hypothesis. The alternative is that the choices of SMs are shaped by some
kind of other-regarding preferences. In that case r might differ across subjects
9That is, we employed the strategy method — i.e., Group A and Group B members made
their decisions simultaneously.
10 In CC, Group A members have no decision to make. In this treatment we asked them
to answer a question which did not affect the payments of Group A members and Group B
members.
11Since subjects in our experiments receive the variable part of their earnings from a single
game and since we expected the payoffs from that game to differ substantially across subjects
(the lowest possible payoff is 0 ECUs and the highest payoff is 60 ECUs for players in both
roles in all our treatments) we decided for a relatively high fixed income to ensure that lowest
earnings remained in a reasonable range.
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and treatments. Let rG denote the average transfers from SMs to FMs in game
G ∈ {IG,DC,GC, V C,CC}.
a) Identification of Unconditional Other-Regarding Preferences (HU ):
In CC, FMs do not have a decision to make. Thus, nothing is revealed in this
game by the choice of the FM. So, arguably, SMs cannot be motivated by deal-
responsiveness, gift-responsiveness, or vulnerability-responsiveness in this game
and any transfer is arguably due to unconditional other-regarding preferences.
The null hypothesis here is that unconditional other-regarding preferences are
unimportant (HU0 : rCC = 0), with the alternative that they lead to positive
transfers (HUA : rCC > 0).
b) Identification of the Joint Impact of Deal-Responsiveness, Gift-Respon-
siveness and Vulnerability-Responsiveness (HD,G,V ): In IG, the choice of
option (b) by the FM reveals willingness to create the possibility for a mu-
tual improvement (or ‘deal’, D), willingness to allow the SM to obtain an im-
provement (or ‘gift’, G), and willingness to accept vulnerability — see Table
2 for details. Thus, in IG SMs can be motivated to return positive amounts
by unconditional other-regarding preferences, by deal-responsiveness, by gift-
responsiveness, and by vulnerability-responsiveness. Since SMs who are asked
to make a choice in IG face exactly the same opportunity set as ‘SMs’ in CC, but
— in contrast to CC — know that the FM has chosen the opportunity set, con-
clusions about whether back-transfers in IG are motivated by conditional other-
regarding preferences (i.e., jointly by deal-responsiveness, gift-responsiveness
and vulnerability-responsiveness) are based on differences between IG and CC
in the amounts of money returned by SMs to FMs. The null hypothesis here
is that there is no joint impact of deal-responsiveness, gift-responsiveness and
vulnerability-responsiveness (HD,G,V0 : rCC ≥ rIG), with the alternative that
there is one (HD,G,VA : rCC < rIG).
c) Identification of the Joint Impact of Gift-Responsiveness and Vulner-
ability-Responsiveness in the Absence of Deal-Responsiveness
(HG,V (abs.D)): In DC, the choice of option (b) by the FM — while allowing
the SM to obtain an improvement and making the FM vulnerable, does not
create the possibility for a mutual improvement. Thus, in DC SMs can be
motivated to return positive amounts by unconditional other-regarding prefer-
ences, by gift-responsiveness, and by vulnerability-responsiveness. By contrast,
in CC ‘SMs’ are arguably only motivated by unconditional other-regarding pref-
erences. We therefore address the question of whether there is a joint impact
of gift-responsiveness and vulnerability-responsiveness (in the absence of D) by
comparing the amounts of money transferred by SMs to FMs across DC and CC.
The null hypothesis here is that there is no joint impact of gift-responsiveness
and vulnerability-responsiveness in the absence of D (H
G,V (abs.D)
0 : rCC ≥ rDC),
with the alternative that there is one (H
G,V (abs.D)
A : rCC < rDC).
d) Identification of the Impact of Vulnerability-Responsiveness in the
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Absence of Deal-Responsiveness and Gift-Responsiveness (HV (abs.D,G)):
In GC, the choice of option (b) by the FM — while making the FM vulnerable
— does neither create the possibility for a mutual improvement, nor allow the
SM to obtain an unilateral improvement. Thus, SMs in GC can be motivated
to return positive amounts by unconditional other-regarding preferences and
by vulnerability-responsiveness, while ‘SMs’ in CC are arguably only motivated
by unconditional other-regarding preferences. We therefore address the ques-
tion of whether there is an impact of vulnerability-responsiveness in the ab-
sence of deal-responsiveness and gift-responsiveness by comparing the amounts
of money returned by SMs to FMs across GC and CC. The null hypothesis
here is that there is no impact of vulnerability-responsiveness in the absence
of D and G (H
V (abs.D,G)
0 : rCC ≥ rGC), with the alternative that there is one
(H
V (abs.D,G)
A : rCC < rGC).
e) Identification of the Incremental Impact of Vulnerability-
Responsiveness in the Presence of Deal-Responsiveness and Gift-
Responsiveness (HV (pres.D,G)): In VC, the choice of option (b) by the FM —
while creating the possibility for a mutual improvement and allowing the SM to
obtain an improvement — does not make the FM vulnerable. Since this latter
property is the only difference (regarding revealed intentions) to IG (see Figure
1 and Tables 1 and 2), conclusions about whether there is an incremental impact
of vulnerability-responsiveness in the presence of D and G are based on differ-
ences between IG and VC in the amounts of money returned by SMs to FMs.
The null hypothesis here is that there is no incremental impact of vulnerability-
responsiveness in the presence of D and G (H
V (pres.D,G)
0 : rV C ≥ rIG), with the
alternative that there is one (H
V (pres.D,G)
A : rVC < rIG).
f) Identification of the Joint Impact of Deal-Responsiveness and Gift-
Responsiveness in the Absence of Vulnerability-Responsiveness
(HD,G(abs.V )): In VC, the choice of option (b) by the FM — while creating the
possibility for a mutual improvement and allowing the SM to obtain an improve-
ment — does not make the FM vulnerable. Thus, in VC SMs can be motivated
to return positive amounts by unconditional other-regarding preferences, by
deal-responsiveness and by gift-responsiveness, while ‘SMs’ in CC are arguably
only motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences. We therefore ad-
dress the question of whether there is a joint impact of deal-responsiveness and
gift-responsiveness in the absence of V by comparing the amounts of money
returned by SMs to FMs between VC and CC. The null hypothesis here is that
there is no joint impact of deal-responsiveness and gift-responsiveness in the
absence of V (H
D,G(abs.V )
0 : rCC ≥ rV C), with the alternative that there is one
(H
D,G(abs.V )
A : rCC < rV C).
g) Identification of the Joint Impact of Deal-Responsiveness and Gift-
Responsiveness in the Presence of Vulnerability-Responsiveness
(HD,G(pres.V )): In GC, the choice of option (b) by the FM — while making
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the FM vulnerable — does neither create the possibility for a mutual improve-
ment nor allow the SM to obtain an improvement. Since those latter properties
are the only differences (regarding revealed intentions) to IG, conclusions about
whether there is a joint impact of deal-responsiveness and gift-responsiveness in
the presence of V are based on differences between IG and GC in the amounts
of money returned by SMs to FMs. The null hypothesis here is that there
is no joint impact of deal-responsiveness and gift-responsiveness in the pres-
ence of V (H
D,G(pres.V )
0 : rGC ≥ rIG), with the alternative that there is one
(H
D,G(pres.V )
A : rGC < rIG).
h) Identification of the Incremental Impact of Deal-Responsiveness in
the Presence of Gift-Responsiveness and Vulnerability-Responsiveness
(HD(pres.G,V )): In DC, the choice of option (b) by the FM — while allowing the
SM to obtain an improvement and making the FM vulnerable — does not cre-
ate the possibility for a mutual improvement. Since this latter property is the
only difference (regarding revealed intentions) to IG, conclusions about whether
there is an incremental impact of deal-responsiveness in the presence of G and V
are based on differences between IG and DC in the amounts of money returned
by SMs to FMs. The null hypothesis here is that there is no incremental impact
of deal-responsiveness in the presence of G and V (H
D(pres.G,V )
0 : rDC ≥ rIG),
with the alternative that there is one (H
D(pres.G,V )
A : rDC < rIG).
i) Identification of the Incremental Impact of Gift-Responsiveness in
the Presence of Vulnerability-Responsiveness but Absence of Deal-
Responsiveness (HG(pres.V,abs.D)): In GC, the choice of option (b) by the
FM — while making the FM vulnerable — does neither create the possibility
for a mutual improvement nor allow the SM to obtain an improvement. Since
the improvement for the SM is the only difference (regarding revealed inten-
tions) to DC, conclusions about whether there is an incremental impact of gift-
responsiveness in the presence of V and absence of D are based on differences
between GC and DC in the amounts of money returned by SMs to FMs. The
null hypothesis here is that there is no incremental impact of gift-responsiveness
in the presence of V and absence of D (H
G(pres.V,abs.D)
0 : rGC ≥ rDC), with the
alternative that there is one (H
G(pres.V,abs.D)
A : rGC < rDC).
<Insert Table 3 about here.>
5 Experimental Results and Discussion
5.1 Experimental Results
Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies of transfers from SMs to FMs in the
five treatments and reveals some notable differences between treatments: While
about half of the SMs transfer zero in treatments IG, DC and GC (the exact
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fractions are 50.00% in IG, 46.15% in DC, and 48.72% in GC), more than 70%
do so in VC and more than 65% do so in CC (the exact fractions are 71.79% for
VC and 65.79% for CC). The behavior of those subjects is consistent with our
null hypothesis that the behavior of SMs is exclusively driven by material self-
interest, whereas the behavior of the rest of the subjects is not in line with that
hypothesis. At the other extreme, about 30% of SMs in treatments IG, DC and
GC transfer at least 30 ECUs to the paired FM (the exact fractions are 27.50% in
IG, 30.77% in DC and 33.33% in GC), while the respective fractions are 15.38%
in VC and only 10.53% in CC.12 A SM returns never more than 45 ECUs to
the paired FM in any of the treatments. The pronounced differences in the tails
of the distribution of transfers from SMs to FMs between treatments IG, DC
and GC on the one hand, and treatments VC and CC on the other hand, also
manifest themselves in the mean transfers from SMs to FMs. Those transfers
are reported in the diagonal of Table 4, while the cells below the diagonal record
the results of statistical tests of the pairwise comparisons between treatments
— the results of the t-test are recorded in parentheses, while the results of the
Mann-Whitney U-test (referred to as MWU-test below) are recorded in brackets.
As can be seen in the diagonal the mean amount transferred by SMs is above
12 ECUs in treatments IG, DC and GC (specifically, it is 12.13 ECUs in IG,
12.69 ECUs in DC, and 12.82 ECUs in GC), but below 7 ECUs in treatments
VC and CC (specifically, 6.67 ECUs in VC and 6.18 ECUs in CC).
<Insert Figure 2 and Table 4 about here.>
Turning to the hypotheses formulated in Section 4 statistical tests yield the
following results:
a) HU suggests testing for the relevance of unconditional other-regarding
preferences for the transfers from SMs to FMs by analyzing transfers in CC. In
the diagonal of Table 4 we see that the mean amount transferred by ‘SMs’ is 6.18
ECUs, which is significantly greater than zero according to the one-tailed t-test
(p = 0.000). This confirms the behavioral relevance of unconditional other-
regarding preferences established in previous work (by Cox 2004, for instance).
b) HD,G,V suggests testing for the joint impact of conditional other-
regarding concerns (i.e., the joint impact of deal-responsiveness, gift-
responsiveness and vulnerability-responsiveness) by comparing back-transfers
in IG with transfers in CC. In the diagonal of Table 4 we see that the mean
amount transferred by SMs is 12.13 ECUs in IG, but only 6.18 ECUs in CC,
suggesting that the back-transfers in IG are significantly higher than the trans-
fers in the CC. Significance is confirmed by the two-tailed t-test (p = 0.042) and
the MWU-test (p = 0.067). Thus, both tests support the hypothesis that there
is a joint impact of conditional other-regarding concerns.13
12Here note that a transfer of 30 ECUs implies an equal split of the 60 ECUs between the
two players.
13Taken together the results for HU and HD,G,V confirm the findings by Cox (2004) that
both unconditional and conditional other-regarding preferences play a role for the behavior of
SMs in the investment game.
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c) HG,V (abs.D) suggests testing for the joint impact of gift-responsiveness
and vulnerability-responsiveness in the absence of D by comparing back-
transfers in DC with transfers in CC. The diagonal of Table 4 reports that the
mean amount transferred by SMs is 12.69 ECUs in DC, but only 6.18 ECUs in
CC, suggesting that the mean amount transferred is significantly greater in DC
than in CC. Significance is confirmed by the two-tailed t-test (p = 0.021) and
the MWU-test (p = 0.031). Hence, both tests support the hypothesis that there
is a joint impact of gift-responsiveness and vulnerability-responsiveness, even in
absence of D.
d)HV (abs.D,G) suggests testing for the impact of vulnerability-responsiveness
in the absence of D and G by comparing back-transfers in GC with trans-
fers in CC. The diagonal of Table 4 reports that the mean amount transferred
by SMs is 12.82 ECUs in GC, but only 6.18 ECUs in CC, suggesting that the
mean amount transferred is significantly greater in GC than in CC. This is
confirmed by the two-tailed t-test (p = 0.021) and the MWU-test (p = 0.043).
Thus, both tests support the hypothesis that there is an impact of vulnerability-
responsiveness even in the absence of D and G.
e)HV (pres.D,G) suggests testing for the incremental impact of vulnerability-
responsiveness in the presence of D and G by comparing back-transfers
between IG and VC. The diagonal of Table 4 reveals that the mean trans-
fer is 12.13 in IG, but only 6.67 in VC. Applying our tests, we find that the
transfers are significantly higher in IG than in VC according to the two-tailed
t-test (p = 0.075) and the MWU-test (p = 0.050). Hence, both tests sup-
port the conclusion that there is indeed an incremental impact of vulnerability-
responsiveness in the presence of D and G.
f) HD,G(abs.V ) suggests testing for the joint impact of deal-responsiveness
and gift-responsiveness in the absence of V by comparing back-transfers in
VC with transfers in CC. The diagonal of Table 4 reports that the mean amount
transferred by SMs is 6.67 ECUs in VC and 6.18 ECUs in CC, suggesting no
significant difference. This is confirmed by the two-tailed t-test (p = 0.852) and
the MWU-test (p = 0.770). Hence, both tests confirm that there is no joint
impact of deal-responsiveness and gift-responsiveness in absence of V.
g) HD,G(pres.V ) suggests testing for the joint impact of deal-responsiveness
and gift-responsiveness in the presence of V by comparing back-transfers
in IG and in GC. The diagonal of Table 4 reports that the mean amount trans-
ferred by SMs is 12.13 ECUs in IG and 12.82 ECUs in GC. Not surprisingly,
there is no significant difference according to the two-tailed t-test (p = 0.829)
and the MWU-test (p = 0.853). Hence, the tests do not support the conclu-
sion that deal-responsiveness and gift-responsiveness have a joint impact in the
presence of V.
h) HD(pres.G,V ) suggests testing for the incremental impact of deal-respon-
siveness in the presence of G and V by comparing back-transfers in IG and
in DC. The diagonal of Table 4 reports that the mean amount returned by SMs is
12.13 ECUs in IG and 12.69 ECUs in DC, suggesting that there is no significant
difference in back-transfers between these two treatments. This is confirmed by
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the two-tailed t-test (p = 0.858) and the MWU-test (p = 0.846). Hence, the
tests do not support the hypothesis that deal-responsiveness is an important
driver for the behavior of SMs in the presence of G and V.
i) HD(abs.G,V ) suggests testing for the incremental impact of gift-respon-
siveness in the presence of V (but absence of D) by comparing back-transfers
in DC and in GC. The diagonal of Table 4 reports that the mean amount re-
turned by SMs was 12.69 ECUs in DC and 12.82 ECUs in GC, suggesting
that there is no significant difference in back-transfers between these two treat-
ments. This is confirmed by the two-tailed t-test (p = 0.967) and the MWU-test
(p = 0.983). Hence, the tests do not support the hypothesis that there is an
incremental impact of gift-responsiveness in the presence of V.
Taken together the tests reported here support the following summary state-
ment:
Result 1: Unconditional other-regarding preferences seem to play a role for the
behavior of SMs in the investment game, but such preferences alone are insuffi-
cient to explain behavior. Vulnerability-responsiveness seems to be an important
driver for SM behavior independently of whether vulnerability of the FM comes
together with a gift to the SM or not — or allows for a Pareto improvement or
not. Deal-responsiveness and gift-responsiveness seem to be behaviorally relevant
only in settings where allowing for a Pareto improvement or for an improvement
for the SM entails vulnerability of the FM. Indeed, the binary comparisons be-
tween treatments reveal significant differences in the amounts transferred from
SMs to FMs in the comparisons IG vs. VC, DC vs. CC and GC vs. CC, but
no significant differences in the comparisons IG vs. DC, IG vs. GC and DC vs.
GC, as well as for VC vs. CC.
5.2 Discussion
Our results might seem to support the conclusion that positive reciprocity — as
formally defined by Cox et al. (2008) — is not an important driver for SM be-
havior in the investment game and for related games. This conclusion would be
premature, however. To see this recall that Cox et al. (2008) formulate positive
reciprocity (in a two-player two-stage game of perfect information) as the asser-
tion that a more generous choice by the FM elicits more altruistic preferences
in the SM. According to their generosity definition opportunity set J is more
generous than ("More Generous Than", MGT) opportunity set K if two
conditions are fulfilled: (i) s∗J ≥ s
∗








K . Part (i) of this
relation corresponds almost exactly to our MBT condition, the only difference
being that the latter is defined as a strict inequality while part (i) of the MGT
relation entails a weak inequality. Part (ii) of MGT adds the requirement that
generosity is revealed by the FM’s choice only if — with his choice — he does not
increase his own potential income more than the SM’s potential income. Ac-
cording to MGT the choice of opportunity set (b) reveals generosity in IG, but
opportunity sets (a) and (b) are not MGT-ranked in games DC, GC and VC.
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Thus, the reciprocity axiom by Cox et al. (2008) only makes a prediction for the
comparison IG vs. CC, but remains agnostic regarding the other comparisons
we perform in Subsection 5.1. So, our finding that the behavior of SMs in IG is
qualitatively similar to that in DC and GC, but significantly different to that in
VC and CC does not contradict the Cox et al. (2008) reciprocity axiom — the
axiom rather correctly predicts the difference in SM behavior between IG and
CC, but is agnostic about the other comparisons. One conclusion regarding reci-
procity one can draw from our data is that a reciprocity notion based exclusively
on the gift part of the MGT definition misses the point — that is, something like
part (ii) of the MGT definition seems to be an important ingredient to a sen-
sible definition of revealed generosity. A second conclusion worth stressing is
that unconditional other-regarding preferences plus reciprocity à la Cox et al.
(2008) alone are insufficient to explain SM behavior in our games. By contrast,
unconditional other-regarding preferences plus vulnerability-responsiveness as
defined here can potentially explain SM behavior in all the games we consider.
An open question is whether adding a given motive (or a given combina-
tion of motives) has the same effect independently of the presence or absence
of other motives. While our identification approach does not assume this kind
of additivity of motives, our results seem to suggest that motives are indeed
additive. For instance, SM behavior in VC is qualitatively similar to SM be-
havior in CC, and SM behavior in IG is qualitatively similar to that in GC,
suggesting that adding vulnerability-responsiveness in the presence of D and G
has the same effect as adding vulnerability-responsiveness in the absence of D
and G. We would not put that much emphasis on this finding, though — our
experiments have not been designed to test the additivity issue and our results
in that regard are at best preliminary. Engler et al. (2014) investigate this issue
more systematically in experiments aimed at estimating the utility function of
SMs in two-player two-stage games of perfect information using econometric
techniques. Preliminary results suggest that an additive utility function does
quite a good job in fitting the data regarding SM behavior.
6 Definitions of Trust Act, Trustworthy Act and
Trust-Responsive Motivation
Prompted by the experimental results reported in Section 5 we now present
formal definitions of trust act, trustworthy act and trust-responsive motivation.
Our definitions are more specific than the verbal definitions typically employed
in the non-economic literature and at the same time more general than the
game-specific definitions typically used in the (experimental) economic litera-
ture. Based on the notation introduced in Section 2 we first introduce a partial
ordering over opportunity sets — the ‘More Trusting Than’ (MTT) relation —
and then use it in our definition of a trust act:
Definition 5 Consider two opportunity sets J and K in O. We say that op-
portunity set J ⊂ R2+ is more trusting than ("More Trusting Than", MTT)
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The MTT relation imposes two requirements. The first condition says that
for opportunity set J to be more trusting than some other opportunity set K,
the maximum income the FM can get in set J given the SM acts selfishly in
own-money terms falls short of his maximum income in set K under the same
condition. This requirement corresponds to the ‘more vulnerable than’ (MVT)
relation introduced in Section 2. The MTT relation imposes in addition the
requirement that set J must contain an allocation that is better for the FM
(in own-money terms) than the maximum income he can get in set K given
the SM acts selfishly (in own-money terms). Although the second requirement
is fulfilled in the investment game and some variant of it is imposed in most
existing definitions of trust acts, it is debatable whether it is really necessary for
a sensible definition of that concept. Consider, for instance, a (male) decision
maker who is asked by a (female) fellow to lend her some money. It is feasible
that the decision maker agrees and as a consequence he makes himself vulnerable
(i.e., the decision maker bears the risk that he will not get back the money)
without having the prospect of an improvement in material terms. However,
here the prospect of improvement is arguably present in utility terms — for
instance, the decision maker might experience a kind of warm-glow utility from
helping his friend. Since our aim is to provide a definition of a trust act based
exclusively on observable variables asking for the prospect of an improvement
in utility terms is not feasible. Definition 5 therefore insists on the prospect of
a material improvement.
While the two inequalities in Definition 5 seem necessary for characterizing
trust acts, one might argue that they are not sufficient. Fehr (2009, p.238), for
instance, writes: “An individual (let’s call her the trustor or investor) trusts if
she voluntarily places resources at the disposal of another party (the trustee)
without any legal commitment from the latter. In addition, the act of trust is
associated with an expectation that the act will pay off in terms of the investor’s
goals.” This definition adds to the two conditions in Definition 5 the requirement
that a trust act by the FM must allow for an improvement for the SM (because
placing resources at the disposal of the SM allows the latter to improve in
material terms according to our definition in Section 2). While this requirement
has appeal, adding it has the consequence that trust becomes a special case of
generosity as defined by Cox et al. (2008) — in the sense, that we can have
generosity without trust but not vice versa. Also, there are many interesting
real world examples of behavior where we would consider it natural to speak of
“trusting behavior” although there is no gift involved. Consider, for instance, a
hungry escaped prisoner who rings at the door of a secluded house to ask for a
piece of bread. The escaped prisoner trusts that the landlord will help him and
will not call the police. If his trust is fulfilled he is better off, if it is violated
he is worse off. However, there is no gift involved here. The landlord is neither
better off if she fulfills nor if she violates the trust — arguably, she would have
been better off if the escaped prisoner had trusted someone else! In sum, we
think that there is room for a plausible definition of trusting behavior that does
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not involve generosity. We next present a definition of a trust act.
Definition 6 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the SM from
the collection of opportunity sets O. If the opportunity sets J and K are both
available (that is, if J,K ∈ O) and J is MTT K then we say that the FM’s
choice of J is a trust act (or trusting behavior).
This definition of a trust act is an identification of behavior not motivation
for that behavior. As explained by Cox (2004), a trust act can be motivated by
FM’s altruistic preferences or by FM’s expectation that SM will reciprocate trust
acts. Data provide support for the empirical significance of both motivations of
FM befavior in the investment game (Cox, 2004), the moonlighting game (Cox,
Sadiraj and Sadiraj, 2008) and the trust game (Cox and Deck, 2005).
We now turn our attention to SM behavior. Given a collection of opportunity
sets O and given that the FM’s actual choice J ∈ O is a trust act, we define
O
J ⊆ O as that subset of the original collection of opportunity sets that contains
only those elements of O that are MTT-ordered with respect to J . By the
definition of a trust act OJ is non-empty and we denote the least trusting




(f, s∗O) ∈ L
J} as “the safety payoff for the FM”.
Definition 7 Suppose the FM chooses the opportunity set J ∈ O from the
collection of opportunity sets O and that the choice of J is a trust act. Then the
behavior of the SM is a trustworthy act iff she chooses an element (fc, sc) ∈ J
such that fc ≥ fsafe.
Having characterized trust act by FM and trustworthy act by SM we now define
trust-responsive motivation by SM.
Definition 8 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the SM from
the collection of opportunity sets O. Suppose the FM chooses J ∈ O. If the
choice of J is a trust act and if this fact elicits more altruistic preferences in
the SM compared to a situation where only J is available we say that the SM is
motivated by trust-responsiveness.
7 Conclusion
This paper has used a five-games design to decompose the drivers for trust-
worthiness. Our diagnostic games have isolated the impact of various combi-
nations of the following motives for back-transfers in the investment game: (i)
unconditional other-regarding preferences — like altruism, inequality aversion,
quasi-maximin, etc.; (ii) deal-responsiveness — reacting to actions that allow for
a mutual improvement by adopting behavior that implies a mutual improve-
ment; (iii) gift-responsiveness — reacting to choices that allow the trustee to
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obtain an improvement by adopting actions that benefit the trustor; and (iv)
vulnerability-responsiveness — reacting to the vulnerability of the trustor by
adopting actions that do not hurt the trustor. Our results have shown that —
besides unconditional other-regarding preferences — vulnerability-responsiveness
is an important determinant of trustworthiness even in cases where the vulnera-
bility of the trustor does not come together with a gift to the trustee. Motivated
by our experimental findings we have provided definitions of trust acts, trustwor-
thy acts and trust-responsive motivation based on revealed willingness to accept
vulnerability and the response to it. An important difference to well-established
definitions is that ours allows trust to come without generosity. This seems more
in line with the everyday usage of that term and it gives room for a role for trust
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Table 1: Treatments and Number of Observations
treatment choice of option (a) implements # of observations (pairs)
IG (f, s) = (15, 15) 40
DC (f, s) = (15, 45) 39
GC (f, s) = (15, 60) 39
VC (f, s) = (0, 15) 39
CC n.a.* 38
overall 195
* n.a. stands for ’not available’: there is no option (a) in CC
Table 2: Revealed Intentions in the Five Games
game choice of option (b) reveals





In the Table the letters D, G and V stand for:
D: ’willingness to create the possibility for a mutual improvement’;
G: ’willingness to allow the SM to obtain an improvement’;
V: ’willingness to accept vulnerability’.
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Table 3: Hypotheses Overview
Abbreviation Tests for Data Source
HU unconditional other-regarding preferences CC
HD,G,V joint impact of D, G and V IG vs. CC
HG,V (abs.D) joint impact of G and V in the absence of D DC vs. CC
HV (abs.D,G) impact of V in the absence of D and G GC vs. CC
HV (pres.D,G) incremental impact of V in the presence of D and G IG vs. VC
HD,G(abs.V ) joint impact of D and G in the absence of V VC vs. CC
HD,G(pres.V ) joint impact of D and G in the presence of V IG vs. GC
HD(pres.G,V ) incremental impact of D in the presence of G and V IG vs. DC
HG(pres.V,abs.D) incremental impact of G in the presence of V but absence of D DC vs. GC
Table 4: Parametric and Nonparametric Tests of SMs Back-Transfers









































D ia g o n a l : m ea n s in fi r s t l in e , s t a n d a r d e r r o r s in b r a cke t s a n d num b e r o f o b s e rva t io n s in b ra c e s .
B e low th e d ia g o n a l : tw o -t a i le d t - t e s t s t a t i s t i c s in p a re n t h e s e s a n d M an n -W h itn e y s ta t i s t i c s in b r a cke t s .
* a n d * * in d ic a t e s i g n ifi c a n c e a t th e 1 0% an d 5% le ve l , r e s p e c t iv e ly.
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In the following we provide an English translation of our originally German
instructions. We provide the instructions and the decision sheets for treatments
IG and CC here. The instructions and decision sheets for the treatments DC,
GC and VC are identical to those for treatment IG (except for the payoffs when
Group A member chooses left). German instructions and questionnaire are
available on request.
[General Instructions, at start of session]
Welcome to an experiment on decision making. We thank you for
your participation!
The experiment consists of two parts: a decision making part and a question-
naire at the end of the experiment. A research foundation has provided the
funds for conducting the experiment. You can earn a considerable amount of
money by participating. The text below will tell you how the amount you earn
will be determined.
No Talking Allowed
Please do not talk to any other participant until the experiment is over. If there
is anything that you don’t understand, please raise your hand. An experimenter
will approach you and clarify your questions in private. In about ten minutes
this document will also be read aloud (by an experimenter).
Anonymity
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the experiment.
Neither the experimenters nor the other subjects will be able to link you to any
of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal
your choices to any other participant. The following means help to guarantee
anonymity:
Non-Computerized Experiment and Private Code
The task you have to complete during the experiment is conducted in private
on a printed form; that is, the experiment is not computerized. You have drawn
a small sealed envelope from a box upon entering the room. PLEASE DO
NOT OPEN YOUR ENVELOPE BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT STARTS.
Your envelope contains your participation number. We will refer to it as "your
private code" in the sequel. Your private code is the only identification used
during the experiment and you will also need it to collect your cash payments.
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Cash Payments
During the experiment we shall not speak of Euros but rather of Talers. At
the end of the experiment the total amount of Talers you have earned will be
converted to Euros at the following rate:
5 Taler = 1 Euro
Cash payments can be collected from Monday onwards in room w3.29 on the
third floor (West) of this building. You will present your private code to an ad-
min staff person (Mrs. xy) and you will receive your cash payment in exchange.
The admin staff person will not know who has done what and why, nor how pay-
ments were generated. No experimenter will be present in the room when you
collect your money. Also, the private codes of this experiment will be mixed up
with the codes of other experiments. This will again help to guarantee that the
amount you earn cannot be linked to your decisions. Mrs. xy is available from
Monday to Friday between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m., as well as between 2 p.m. and
3 p.m. in room w3.29 on the third floor (West) of this building. Please collect
your earnings within a weak (you find those details also on the card displaying
your private code).
Two Groups
Before the experiment starts, the participants in this room will be randomly
divided into two groups of equal size. The groups are called Group A and
Group B. Members of Group A will be seated in this room, members of Group
B will be seated in the adjacent room.
Role Assignment and Start of the Experiment
After the instructions at hand and the detailed instructions have been read
aloud and all questions have been answered you (and all other participants in
this room) will be asked to open the sealed envelope you drew from the box
when entering this room. The envelope contains a card with your private code.
The code ends with a number. If this number is even, you are a member of
Group A, if it is odd, you are a member of Group B. Members of Group A are
asked to take a seat at one of chairs in this room. Members of Group B will be
escorted to the adjacent room and asked to take a seat there. Then the decision
sheets will be handed out and the experiment starts.
[Instructions for Treatment IG]
Matching
Each member of Group A is anonymously paired with a member of Group B.
The matching is 1:1; that is, each member of Group A is exactly matched with
one member of Group B and vice versa. You will never learn the identity of
the member of the other group you are paired with. In the same way,
the member of the other group you are paired with will not learn your identity.




Each member of Group A and each member of Group B will be asked to make
a single decision. The decision of a Group A member always affects not only
her or his own payment but also the payment of the other person. Whether the
decision of a Group B member has an impact on the own payment of the Group
B member and on the payment of the paired Group A member depends on the
decision of the Group A member. We will explain this in detail:
Decision Task of Group A Members and Possible Payments
Each member of Group A will be asked to decide between the two alternatives
LEFT and RIGHT. This is done by marking one of the two options on the top
of the decision sheet (you find a copy of the decision sheet of a Group A member
on the next page).
• If the Group A member chooses LEFT, the payments to both persons
(Group A member and paired Group B member) are not determined
by the decision of the paired Group B member.
• If the Group A member chooses RIGHT, the payments to both persons
(Group A member and paired Group B member) are determined by the
decision of the paired Group B member.
Decision Task of Group B Members and Possible Payments
Each member of Group B will be asked to decide between thirteen alternatives.
This is done by marking one of the 13 rows on the bottom/right of the decision
sheet (you find a copy of the decision sheet of a Group B member on the next
page but one).
• If the paired Group A member has chosen LEFT, the decision of the Group
B member is irrelevant for the payments. In this case the payments for
the Group A member and for the Group B member are as shown on the
left hand side of the decision sheet.
• If the paired Group A member has chosen RIGHT, the decision of the
Group B member determines the payments for the Group A member and
for the Group B member. In the column “Group A member receives” on
the right hand side of the decision sheet you see how many Talers the
member of Group A gets and in the column “Group B member receives”
you see how many Talers the member of Group B gets if the respective
row is chosen by the Group B member.
Pay attention to the fact that the members of Group A and the members of
Group B make their decisions simultaneously. Therefore the member of group
B has to make a decision without knowing the corresponding decision of the
Group A member.
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In the case of wrong decisions (the member of Group A marks both options or
none of them or the member of Group B marks more than one row or none)
you get no payment from this part of the experiment and the payment to the
other person is determined randomly (by randomly implementing one of your
possible choices and matching it with the choice of the other person).
After you have made your decision on the decision sheet, put the decision sheet
into the envelope and wait until an experimenter will collect it. Pay attention
that the envelope is not marked in any way.
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Decision Sheet of a Member of Group A
If you are a member of Group A your decision sheet will look as shown
below. Note that this page is NOT the decision sheet. The decision
sheet will be handed out to you at the start of the experiment.
Decision Sheet - You Are a Member of Group A
Please enter your private code (you will get no payment out of the
experiment in case the private code is missing or wrong):
....................................................................
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Decision Sheet of a Member of Group B
If you are a member of Group B your decision sheet will look as shown
below. Note that this page is NOT the decision sheet. The decision
sheet will be handed out to you at the start of the experiment.
Decision Sheet — You Are a Member of Group B
Please enter your private code (you will get no payment out of the
experiment in case the private code is missing or wrong):
....................................................................
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[Instructions for Treatment CC]
Matching
Each member of Group A is anonymously paired with a member of Group B.
The matching is 1:1; that is, each member of Group A is exactly matched with
one member of Group B and vice versa. You will never learn the identity of
the member of the other group you are paired with. In the same way,
the member of the other group you are paired with will not learn your identity.
In the following we call the member of the other group you are matched with
the other person.
Decision Tasks
Only members of Group B will be asked to make a single decision. The decision
of a Group B member always affects not only her or his own payment but also
the payment of the paired Group A member. Group A members will be asked
to answer a single question (you find a copy of the decision sheet of a Group
A member on the next page) in the meantime and the answer to this question
does not affect her or his own payment nor the payment of the paired Group B
member. We will explain this in detail:
Decision Task of Group B Members and Possible Payments
Each member of Group B will be asked to decide between thirteen alternatives.
This is done by marking one of the 13 rows on the bottom/right of the decision
sheet (you find a copy of the decision sheet of a Group B member on the next
page but one).
• The decision of the Group B member determines the payments for the
Group A member and for the Group B member. In the column “Group A
member receives” on the right hand side of the decision sheet you see how
many Talers the member of Group A gets and in the column “Group B
member receives” you see how many Talers the member of Group B gets
if the respective row is chosen by the Group B member.
In the case of wrong decisions (the member of Group B marks more than one
row or none) the Group B member gets no payment from this part of the
experiment and the payment to the other person is determined randomly (by
randomly implementing one of the possible choices and matching it with the
other person).
After you have made your decision on the decision sheet respectively after you
have answered the question on the question sheet, put the decision sheet (ques-
tion sheet) into the envelope and wait until an experimenter will collect it. Pay
attention that the envelope is not marked in any way.
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Question Sheet of a Member of Group A
If you are a member of Group A your question sheet will look as shown
below. Note that this page is NOT the question sheet. The question
sheet will be handed out to you at the start of the experiment.
Question Sheet — You Are a Member of Group A
Please enter your private code (you will get no payment out of the
experiment in case the private code is missing or wrong):
....................................................................




Decision Sheet of a Member of Group B
If you are a member of Group B your decision sheet will look as shown
below. Note that this page is NOT the decision sheet. The decision
sheet will be handed out to you at the start of the experiment.
Decision Sheet — You Are a Member of Group B
Please enter your private code (you will get no payment out of the
experiment in case the private code is missing or wrong):
....................................................................
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